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Swedes in Barbary Captivity: The Political Culture of *Human Security*, Circa 1660-1760

Joachim Östlund*

Abstract: »Schweden in Gefangenschaft der Barbaresken: Die politische Kultur humaner Sicherheit, circa 1660-1760«. This article aims to present a specific form of “Human Security” during the Early Modern era. As a case study, the relationship between Sweden and the North African states will be put forward. The Swedish maritime expansion in the Mediterranean during the 17th century resulted in insecurity for the men who manned the ships when they became targets for Muslim corsairs from North Africa. This article explores how the Swedish state responded to the threat towards its seamen during a period of 100 years (1660-1760). The Kingdom not only reacted militarily or diplomatically towards this threat. Intense attention was also paid to humanitarian aspects on the level of the individual. The state tried several preventative measures to reduce the risk of captivity and installed a nation-wide ransoming system. The article highlights the complex relationship between state security and human security and shows how cultural values, economy, institutions and international politics also give form and substance to the praxis of the “Production of Human Security”.

Keywords: Sweden-North Africa relations, national security, human insecurity, human security, captivity, ransoming.

Introduction

The Swedish maritime enterprise in the Mediterranean during the middle of the seventeenth century not only resulted in the import of cheap salt but also in new politics of security for the men who manned the ships. Muslim corsairs operating from the present-day Maghreb states posed a serious danger towards the shipping of all European nations in the Mediterranean. The biggest threat was their attempts to seize the cargo and carry their crew to the slave markets of North Africa. Usually the captives were engaged in hard labor and held for ransom. In their letters asking for help and in the writings of eyewitnesses, this bondage was described as slavery. The reactions from relatives and authorities were intense, and the social anxiety about the captivity of large groups of men

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resulted in responses unusual for the Early Modern period. The purpose of this paper is to discuss humanitarian aspects of the necessary protection of trade.

The human dimension of security, or the question of security in people's daily lives, emerged in the 1990s as a conceptual response to two changing dimensions of the international order, referred to as globalization and the end of the Cold War. This shift was defined and explicated in the 1994 UN Human Development Report. According to the UNHDR, human security meant "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression" and "protections from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life".¹ The UN identifies seven specific sources of human insecurity: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political sources of human insecurity. Since then the term has been used in different ways. On the online database "Human Security Gateway", the human security concept is defined separately from national security, and where the latter is defined, its focus is on the defending of the physical and political integrity of states from external military threats. This distinction is put forward to highlight the fact that the goals of national security may in many cases threaten human security: "Ideally, national security and human security should be mutually reinforcing."² In summary, the model of human security consists primarily of four features: its focus on the individual, its concern with values of personal safety and freedom, its consideration of indirect threats, and its emphasis on non-coercive means.

In the following I will show how human security became an important instrument in the Swedish maritime expansion. The purpose of this article is to trace policies of human security during the period 1660-1760, and to discuss its form and substance. The following questions will be highlighted and discussed in the article: (a) How did the human aspect of security initially become identified? (b) In what ways did human security become an organized and institutionalized part of the Swedish state? (c) How is the Swedish policy of human security related to political, cultural and historical factors?

Identifying Human Insecurity

During the middle of the seventeenth century Swedish economic politics formulated a new interest: to find cheap salt and markets for Swedish staple commodities in Southern Europe. The rising salt prices in Setubal and Lisbon pushed the Swedish merchants into the Mediterranean, and there they entered a world dominated by sea warfare and violence. The struggle for control between the two dominant empires of the region, Spain and the Ottoman Empire, resulted in an unstable and insecure environment. During the seventeenth century

¹ Human Development Report 1994, 23.

² Human Security Report Project.

the conflict transmuted into coastal raids, semi-official privateering and piracy. Constantinople's control over its North African vassals declined and the Barbary Coast became a center of corsairing. On the Christian side, Malta and Livorno played similar roles.³

The insecurity in this area was identified rather quickly when letters from captives in North Africa reached the King, state officials or family members in Sweden. For example, in 1661 a galley slave in Algiers, Johan Arvidsson, sent a letter to the Admiralty about his poor condition. The message was then forwarded to the Church authorities along with the question of whether they could organize alms for a ransom. That was the usual process, and it was repeated in many other cases. But Arvidsson's case was also taken care of by the Lord High Admiral Carl Gustaf Wrangel himself when he informed the Council about a ransom. Later, alms were collected and the Admiralty also gave money to pay the ransom of the galley slave Arvidsson. This example shows that one human being mattered and that it was a question of high priority.⁴ How is it possible to understand this response? As Linda Colley has put forward, the Barbary captives embodied a particularly dramatic form of vulnerability. Collections on behalf of North African captives seem to have elicited higher levels of generosity.⁵ This might also explain why Swedish subjects even gave alms to Greeks who begged for aid in Sweden for their captured family members in Turkey. In 1705 alms were collected all over Sweden for captured monks belonging to the Greek Catholic Archimandrite at the St. Athanasius Cloister.⁶

But ransoming was sometimes lacking, for different reasons. This becomes visible in a report about a ransom written by Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeldt to the King. Sparwenfeldt was a traveller and researcher who, during a journey in North Africa in 1691, had interviewed Swedish captives. In his report he recommended that a ransom should be paid for "the best, the most functional, the youngest and purest Swedes". Old, damaged and "un-Swedish" bodies should not be liberated according to this line of thought. Many of the individuals interviewed by Sparwenfeldt had been held in captivity for more than ten years, and most of them had been captured on ships from Holland. Because of their Swedish citizenship they had been left behind, according to Sparwenfeldt.⁷ This was also the praxis among the European states: Each state ransomed its own citizens. It is therefore important to emphasize that human security at this stage was dependent on citizenship.

In Sweden, information about what was happening in North Africa was fragmented during the second half of the seventeenth century. This can partly

³ Müller 2004, 30-31, 49-51.

⁴ Ekman 1962, 70.

⁵ Colley 2002, 77-78.

⁶ Forsell and Granstedt 1949, 28; Lundström 1906, 119.

⁷ Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica*: bihang Tripolitana, vol. 7, 1694.

be explained by the Protestant Reformation, which ended the contact with ransoming organizations that had existed in Catholic European states since the thirteenth century, such as the Mercedarians and the Trinitarians. The Church of Sweden was indeed active in raising ransoms and publishing the plight of Barbary captives, but it lacked the contacts and knowledge of the Catholic redemptionist orders in Continental Europe. The basic information came from sporadic official contacts, and the letters from captives. Let's take a closer look at the letters – this is where the discourse of security was formulated by the victims.

The letters from captives in North Africa give information about what they expected from relatives or authorities at home. What demands were possible? Did they beg for help, demand help, or did they even ask when they would be helped? When Swedish seamen in bondage wrote letters for help, many of them sought aid directly from the King. In a Lutheran society this was a normal thing, since the King was not only the head of state but also the head of the church. According to the Lutheran state ideology, the sovereign symbolizes the Lord – judging, preserving order, and guaranteeing prosperity – and the good shepherd who demonstrates virtues, comforts and gives his blessing. This paternalistic idea of double responsibility was a commonly held norm repeated from the middle of the sixteenth century in prayer days, proclamations and propaganda in everyday life in Swedish society. According to this line of thought, an imagined bond was created between the King and each and every individual in the realm.⁸ This ideology is also reflected in the letters.

Many letters are signed by five, ten or even fifteen people. The first item is typically a salutation to the addressee, and after that there is an explanation of the case. Some petitions are broader in scope, giving details about what has happened and the problems they are dealing with. All the letters are united by their paternalistic subordination in line with Lutheran ideology, the descriptions of their misery, and their ambition to evoke benevolence. The detailed description of their misery should be taken seriously, but at the same time, this was also a rhetorical strategy used to create an emphatic identification and strengthen the will to do honorable deeds. This idea is very distinct in the letters. In many of the early letters compassion with the victim is most important argument for aid, but in some cases demands for help are also put forward, as in the following example:

some of us here gathered in greatest truth, on our bare knees, with buoyant bitter tears of the heart and the eyes, praying and demanding, one more time, for Your Royal Highness' help and liberation.⁹

⁸ Östlund 2007, 55-56.

⁹ Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica: bihang Algerica*, vol. 15, 1680.

The next argument is formulated as a direct reflection of the Lutheran ideology. This time the King, not his subjects, is addressed and informed of the consequences of the deeds which reflect the fundament of the political and moral order. The letter says that if the King liberates them, this will be “very delightful to God the Almighty”, and therefore, the King’s “great richness should not diminish, but by the good God many times be blessed and increase”.¹⁰ In a religious world view, this argument should not be taken too lightly. The religious view of human security is common to many letters: for example, “all this pain to my body does not hurt me as much as their will [for me] to give up my religion”.¹¹ This shows what they feared. It is also clear that the captives turned the ideological statements back towards the party that represented them, and even raised demands to be liberated. But what is the meaning of freedom according to the captives? Many captives argue that they want to be subjects under a rightful and benevolent king, not a tyrant: “that we one more time could return to our dear fatherland with joy and health ... and that we poor slaves continue to be His Royal Highness’ and our most merciful King’s most humble servants.”¹² Security, or even freedom, is here defined as belonging to the benevolent King. If the King does not help, his legitimacy is contested and therefore the messages are composed as a reminder of the moral obligation defined by the state. What was the impact of these cries for help?

Solutions to Human Insecurity

The Swedish response to corsair activity was not entirely similar to how other European states reacted. At an early stage the Swedish state chose negotiation instead of “forceful persuasion”, or coercive diplomacy, towards the North African states. Swedish ships never participated in any bombings of harbors, and even in the beginning of the nineteenth century wars were believed to be “an infinitely high price for security”.¹³ The first attempt by the state to ransom Swedish captives was made by Captain Jöns Barkman in 1661, the same year that the first letter, from Johan Arvidsson, arrived in Sweden. His visit and contact with the Dey in Algiers was also related in a letter from a large group of captives addressed to the Chancellor of the State in 1662. They wrote that Barkman had visited them twice, but failed in the negotiation to get them re-

¹⁰ Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica*: bihang Algerica, vol. 15, 1680.

¹¹ Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica*: bihang Algerica, vol. 15, 1707.

¹² Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica*: bihang Algerica, vol. 15, 1724.

¹³ Lunds universitetsbibliotek, De la Gardieska collection: historical documents, 25:4, 800-01-09. Eric Sköldebrand, consul in Algiers, report: “Upplysningar, rörande De Barbariska Staterne samt olägenhetene och förmonera af Krig eller fred med de samma”, signed in Stockholm, 9 January 1800.

leased.¹⁴ His failure might explain the next reaction from the state: retribution by corsairing. In 1663 a secret privateer company was founded by the Queen Dowager and a number of councilors. The purpose was to capture Muslim ships in the Red Sea. In September one ship out of two reached its destination and was successful in taking two richly-laden Muslim vessels. But from the investors' point of view the expedition was not a success.¹⁵ This corsair activity was an exception, and after this failure, Swedish politics towards the North African states changed.

Among state officials and merchants, the relationship now turned into a question of how to implement solutions for human security. Swedish merchants met the threat from the corsairs with insurance from companies in Amsterdam. Different strategies about "security from the Turk" are also put forward. In a legal case from 1666 about such insurance, it was mentioned that seamen were skeptical towards this shipping; a merchant wrote in a document that "no seaman will sail on that ship because of fear of the Turk."¹⁶ A different kind of insurance, or systems of convoying to meet the risk of Turkish captivity, were discussed by Swedish merchants during the middle of the seventeenth century, and ideas of human security were transformed in this way into an important factor for a successful economic enterprise.

On a state level, different non-coercive strategies towards human insecurity were formulated in 1668 when the Board of Trade decided that a peace treaty was needed. This had a humanitarian dimension where one of the motives was: "so that our subjects can trade under secure conditions". This response reveals an awareness of the importance of the sailors. This was further underlined when, in the same year, the Board of Trade took the initiative of a collection of alms for the ransoming of captives.¹⁷ To accomplish peace with the most powerful state in North Africa, Algiers, the plan was to send the Jewish professional negotiator, Azeweda from Amsterdam, together with the Swede Eosander. Unfortunately this plan was cancelled because the ship was caught in ice, and because of certain political factors. Then a new expedition was planned, to be undertaken by Jöns Barkman in 1669. But this initiative was also cancelled when a group of powerful politicians objected with the argument that a Swedish peace with Algiers could create irritation in Holland and England.¹⁸ Swedish loyalties in European power politics become a hindrance, and the first step to a harmonization between state security and human security failed.

¹⁴ Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica*: bihang Algerica, vol. 15, 1662.

¹⁵ Kröger 1854, 25-26.

¹⁶ Söderberg 1935, 140.

¹⁷ Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, Letter from the Board of Trade to His Royal Majesty, 1668, 26/4.

¹⁸ Ekegård 1924, 252.

In 1671 the Swedish seamen in Barbary captivity were officially described as a serious problem in a national proclamation in the churches by the Queen Regent Hedevig Eleonora. Benevolence towards the seamen in bondage was her main argument: Everybody should give alms and show compassion towards these poor victims. This was the wish of the Queen Regent, and it was also motivated by the duty to love one's neighbor. This view of the victim shows that the individual had a double relationship towards the sovereign: one bound to religion, and the other to the fatherland. Therefore the Queen concluded that there were two motives for collecting ransom funds for these individuals: to save their souls and to secure their bodies.¹⁹ This was a rather forceful reaction to a problem that was not yet very serious. At the same time, this announcement reflected one of the greatest fears during the second half of the seventeenth century: the fear of the Turk.

In the mid-seventeenth century the salt trade between Sweden and Portugal was established, but Swedish merchants did not enter the Mediterranean extensively until the late 1690s.²⁰ It is clear that the Swedish authorities and merchants were well aware of the risks of sailing in Southern waters, and that a number of strategies had already been put to the test to reduce the risk. During this period no insurance company existed in Sweden, nor was there any official organization for dealing with ransoming. The payment of ransoms depended on initiatives taken by the captives in their letters as a request, hoping for the goodwill of relatives, county governors, the Church, the Admiralty, the King, or the Board of Trade. For example, in 1699 the carpenter Jonas Thorson was captured by corsairs from Algiers, and in 1707 one of his many letters finally reached its destination, his parents in Karlskrona.²¹ In this letter he told them that he had been sold twice on the slave auction, and then asked them for help to request a collection of alms for his freedom. His parents took the letter to the magistrate and explained the situation. Then the magistrate contacted the county governor, who finally sent a letter to the King requesting national alms.²² Even former captives took the initiative to collect ransoms: for example, Mats "Moor" Börgesson in 1666, who was granted royal permission to collect ransom funds (probably for his comrades left behind in North Africa).²³ These examples show that solutions to human insecurity could differ. There existed no formal organization to which the captives could send their letters,

¹⁹ Lunds universitetsbibliotek, Kongl: may:ts placat, om hielp til the fångnas i Turckiet åtherlösn. Stockholm, 1671.

²⁰ Müller 2004, 55.

²¹ Riksarkivet Stockholm, *Diplomatica Turcica*: bihang Algerica, 1707.

²² Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, Landshövdingarnas skrivelser till Kungl. Majt Blekinge län vol. 2. Landshöv. Otter om en kollekt öfver hela riket för befrielse af sjömannen Jonas Thorson som blifigt tillfångatagen af sjöröfvare och såld till slaf. 1707, 26.7.

²³ Landsarkivet i Göteborg, Göteborgs rådhusrätts dombok, January 1666 (digital archive).

but as these instances demonstrate, help was given anyway. Because of the irregular system, it is quite difficult to give reliable answers about the results of the practice of human security. More research is needed in order to estimate how many people made it back home during this period. In the beginning of the eighteenth century the situation in Swedish society had changed in major ways – changes that would affect the outcome of human security in the Southern waters.

The Realization of Human Security

Following the end of the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, secure trading and the economy were of the utmost importance for the bankrupt Swedish state. The humanitarian disaster caused by the war and the downfall of Caroline absolutism resulted in a changed view of citizenship. This can be seen in the constitution of 1720, which, for example, caused Voltaire to declare Sweden to be the “the freest land in the world”. Rousseau called the constitution “an example of perfection” and Gabriel Bonnot de Mably called it “a masterpiece of modern legislation”.²⁴ The disastrous war ended the Swedish era of great power and changed the attitude of many politicians. War was now believed to be the greatest threat to national security, and therefore economic development became a question of national security.

With the end of the war, the protection of shipping in the Mediterranean received high priority. This can be seen in a couple of decisions. In 1724 the Swedish Convoy Office (*Konvojkommissariatet*) was founded, with the purpose of organizing and securing shipping in Southern Europe. Convoying, peace treaties with and consular service in North African states, and the ransoming of captured Swedes were now carried out under the umbrella of one institution. It was financed with the *Extra-Licent*, a duty established by merchants in 1723 to be paid on exports and imports.²⁵ And in 1726 a decision was made to organize four national collections of alms each year to pay the ransoms of Swedes in Barbary captivity. During these years large amounts of money were collected through alms in Sweden. The Swedish Parliament also established a committee that would be responsible for these funds, the “Algerian Fund Office” (*Riksens Ständers deputation öfver det Algieriska Fondwercket*). As an example of the monetary sums involved, during the years 1755-1760 the Swedish state paid 130,000 Riksdaler for ransomed Swedish captives in Morocco. This amount is equivalent to approx. 5 million Euros today.²⁶ What is important here is that these decisions show how the question

²⁴ Roberts 1995, 91.

²⁵ Kröger 1854, 25-27.

²⁶ Olán 1921, 108.

of human security was transferred to the state level, and that as a consequence the system became professionalized and institutionalized. Of great importance is the treaty made between Sweden and Algiers in 1729. This treaty was shaped along the lines of other treaties between European states and Algiers, and with it a consular service and the system of Algerian passports were established. The purpose of the treaty was to ensure trade security and, not least, that of the seamen. The Swedish treaty with Algiers also stated that the consul had the right to have a priest at the consulate and that Christian slaves had the right to attend the sermons. The religious aspect of human security was also followed up when Jacob Serenius, a Swedish priest in London, received permission to send “forbidden” hymn books to Swedish captives in Algiers and to other seamen sailing in these waters.²⁷ State officials were also concerned about captives who were held in bondage for longer periods, that “these poor slaves without hope of ransoming should take injury to body and soul”.²⁸

Compared to the political situation during the second half of the seventeenth century, when European power politics became a hindrance for a peace treaty with Algiers, Sweden gained a powerful ally in the beginning of the eighteenth century, namely the Sublime Porte. Together they were united against the common enemy, Russia. This, in turn, affected the relationship towards the North African states. According to David Gustaf Ankarloo, the Swedish consular secretary in Algiers (1801-10), the peace treaty with Algiers was struck under good conditions thanks to the agency of the Sublime Porte.²⁹ With the changing political map, Swedish diplomats could now use the friendship of the Sublime Porte. Swedish diplomats too, for example, raised questions about security from corsairs from the Ottoman regencies Tunis and Tripoli.³⁰ In 1737 the Swedish-Turkish economic relations were settled, and later strengthened with a treaty of commerce and a military alliance.³¹ According to the researcher Verner Söderberg, the relationship with the Sublime Porte resulted in cheaper treaties and tributes compared to countries such as Denmark, France, England and Spain.³²

After the treaty with Algiers, treaties were made with Tunis (1736), Tripoli (1741) and Morocco in 1763. Another important institution during the middle of the eighteenth century was the organization of seamen’s establishments (Sjömanshus) in different cities. There are examples of seamen’s wives apply-

²⁷ Jacobowsky 1930, 95.

²⁸ Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, Marocko Tanger ang. 3ne svenskar utlösen ur slaveri in T. Composite offices to His Royal Majesty, 1737, 23.11, vol. 13.

²⁹ Lunds universitetsbibliotek, De la Gardieska collection, Codices VIII 32. Ankarloo, David Gustaf, Utdrag af mina bref till M.F., skrifna under mitt vistande i Alger[...]. 1802-1811.

³⁰ Eliasson 2005, 54.

³¹ Karlson 2003, 52-55.

³² Söderberg 1912, 94-95. Around a half billion Euros in today’s value was paid in total to the North African states.

ing for and receiving economic help when their men were enslaved, or worse, when they died in captivity. Ransomed seamen could also get economic help.³³ Before the founding of seamen's establishments, the Convoy Office could also give social funds to ransomed slaves.³⁴ With the seamen's establishments one can say that the human security aspect was in some way extended to the families of the victims.

The consuls in different parts of the Mediterranean world also played an important role for the captives. The duties of the consuls were many. They collected business information, assisted the subjects of their home state in handling contacts with local authorities, and influenced the "protection costs" of the home state's subjects by informing them of risks, and taking measures to diminish such risks.³⁵ They also gave a helping hand to individuals during their captivity in states with no treaty. The latter is shown in letters by captives and in books written by former captives. In Marcus Berg's book "Description of the barbarous slavery in the kingdom of Fez and Morocco" (1757), he portrays the help given by the consul in Algiers, George Logie. Berg writes that during their visit in Fez the survival of the group was totally dependent on the help that was given by George Logie, and according to Berg, Logie also gave them money without the permission of the Swedish state. Berg also writes that he met eight French captives who told him that they had received money and food from the Swedish consul George Logie, but non from the French consul.³⁶ Help from a consul is also mentioned in a letter from four Swedish captives in Morocco, but this time from Consul Jakob Martin Bellman in Cadiz (the uncle of the famous Skald Michael Bellman).³⁷ This contact probably meant a lot to the captives. It is also worth mentioning that George Logie is a common reference in a wide range of documents concerning the relationship between Sweden and the North African states. He was not only one of the most important actors in the politics behind peace treaties between Sweden and the North African states but also one of the most active agents of human security in his work of ransoming Swedes, as well as captives of other nationalities. His work was also well rewarded by the Swedish King when his service ended in 1758.³⁸

As has been shown, different agendas were discussed during the seventeenth century in dealing with the threat from the Barbary corsairs. This continued during the eighteenth century. The question of a Swedish insurance system was raised to meet the fear of the Mediterranean waters. Many ship-owners were

³³ Stockholms stadsarkiv, Sjömanshuset, Gratialansökningar 1749-1775 E IVa kolon 3, 1750-1756 E IVa kolon 1.

³⁴ Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, ang. förskotterade medel för bl.a. underhåll åt lösgivna slavar 1732 23.5. City offices vol. 34.

³⁵ Müller 2004, 20.

³⁶ Berg 1757, 35.

³⁷ Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica Turcica: Bihang Maroccana, vol. 6, 7 May 1760.

³⁸ Kröger 1854, 15, 240, 355, 399.

disappointed with the convoys – they were slow and difficult to organize in an adequate way – but were also skeptical of ideas of a Swedish insurance company: What if only the captain was insured and not the seamen? etc. The importance of this question was also demonstrated when even the government demanded an inquiry (1728) from the Board of Trade, the latter also noting the dilemma if only the skipper, rather than the whole crew, was covered by the insurance.³⁹ These examples speak for themselves: The simple seaman should also be protected from the fear and risk of enslavement.

During the seventeenth century there was not enough capital for the establishment of a Swedish insurance company, but in 1739 the “Stockholms sjöassuranskompani” (“Stockholm sea insurance company”) was established. Its purpose was to break the dependence on foreign companies. And, following this, a Swedish “slave insurance” was also created in 1745: “Insurance on the danger of the Turk and on human life” (“Om Försäkring på Fahra för Turcken och på Menniskiors lif”). This insurance was a direct copy of the Hamburg Laws, which date from 1731. The Hamburgian “Assekuranz- und Havarie-Ordnung” (“Insurance and Damage Regulation”) was also copied directly by Denmark and Prussia. But this insurance was said to be unpopular in Sweden among the foreign companies. Information about the practical use of this insurance is not available yet, but it was probably of no great importance. Still, it is an interesting example of how people tried to deal with the fear of captivity and human security. The captivity of some hundreds of Swedish seamen, maybe up to a thousand in the end, received serious attention. It is noteworthy that the insurance makes a reference to the Admiralty’s “Sclav-Cassa” (slave fund). The term “Slaf-Cassa” is also used by the famous economist Anders Berch in one of his books (1747). According to him, the security for shipping in the Mediterranean was dependent on convoys and treaties. He also wrote that for the seamen there should also be “Slaf-Cassor” when peace was not possible with the corsairs, so that they would not fear sailing in the Southern waters.⁴⁰ This term refers to the existing institutions, Sklavenkassen, in Copenhagen, Lübeck and Hamburg.⁴¹ The praxis was the same, but in Sweden the Konvoj-kommissariatet was the central institution for both ransoming and protection of the shipping.

Previous analysis has shown that the implementation and realization of human security was related to different historical, political and cultural factors. In the following the analysis will highlight how the legal status of human security could differ in relation to the different political and cultural contexts during the beginning of the eighteenth century.

³⁹ Söderberg 1935, 148-150.

⁴⁰ Berch 1747, 323.

⁴¹ Ressel 2010. This volume.

The Political Culture of Human Security

As already mentioned, the European praxis of ransoming was that every state was only responsible for its own subjects. Human security was in this sense limited to citizenship. Other limitations were set by cultural differences. This becomes clear if we compare European treaties regarding prisoners of war with the European peace treaties with the North African states. The praxis among Christian nations of not enslaving prisoners, or civilians, can be seen in an agreement between Sweden and Denmark from 1719. The treatment of the prisoners is regulated in detail. A prisoner of war should be held captive for a maximum of three weeks; he should be treated well and with compassion; he should not be put into any hostile prisons nor forced into any labour, and finally, the wounded or sick have the right to treatment and medicine so that they can be ransomed in good health.⁴² But in relation to non-Christian societies, these types of agreement were in general not considered applicable in Western Europe.⁴³ The same can be said of the perspective from the other side. In the Swedish treaty with Algiers in 1729, the power relationship becomes clear if we look at the regulations for the captives. According to the treaty no Swedish subjects should be harmed or tortured, and no Swedish subject should be enslaved. If a slave flees to a Swedish warship, this person should be taken back (not according to the treaty with Tunis – in this case the slave is free). Finally, a Swedish subject cannot be forced to ransom a slave, even if the slave is his family member, nor can the slave's owner be forced to sell against his will (the deal should be struck with both parties' consent).⁴⁴

From this we can draw the conclusion that human security is related to the contact between states, and that the animosity between the Muslim world and the Christian world played an important role in how human security was implemented. The legal standards in the Swedish treaty are also related to the international standard, where the more powerful states defined the level of human security. The stipulation of the lack of obligation to ransom subjects is also a blueprint from the English treaty with Algiers of 1682. According to Linda Colley this "meanness", in terms of human security, was partly a function of the English state's limited resources at this stage, but also plain meanness.⁴⁵ The stipulation that the Swedish state, or other European states, was under no obligation to ransom its subjects can therefore partly be interpreted as a failure of human security, even if the treaty resulted in the ending of kidnapping. It is also important to highlight that the price for upholding the peace with

⁴² Lunds universitetsbibliotek, Cartel emellan Sverige och Danmark/om Krigs-fångarne slutet Stockholm den 30 April/11 Maji Åhr 1719.

⁴³ Rosas 2005, 48-50.

⁴⁴ Lunds universitetsbibliotek, Freds och handels tractat, emellan kongl. maj:t och cronan Sverige, och republiqven Alger, affhandlad och slutet i Alger then 5/16 aprilis åhr 1729.

⁴⁵ Colley 2002, 53.

the North African states was paid not only with gold, but also with large amounts of weapons and ammunition. In this sense the European states also made it possible for the North African states to continue to threaten their own seamen. It was easier to implement human security where the state had a monopoly of violence, at home.

The system of human security that was established by the Swedish state had strict instructions, especially for the Algerian Sea Passes. In January 1730 the “Rules for Algerians Sea Passes” were published. According to the directions, an Algerian Sea Pass could only be given to Swedish skippers and to foreigners if they had been Swedish burghers for three years. Ship-owners had to swear an oath that they were the only owner, and that the pass should only be used on the ship at hand. The documents were then sent from the Magistrate to the Board of Trade, which then issued a pass. All changes regarding ownership had to be reported the Board of Trade. The Sea Pass was restricted to one journey, and when the ship got back home the skipper had to restore the pass to the Board of Trade within eight days if the harbor was in Stockholm, and in other cases within fourteen days to a county governor, who in turn was to restore the pass to the Board of Trade. The same strict regulations were given if the ship was sold on foreign ground. If somebody falsified or misused a pass on a foreign ship, the punishment was death. If a ship-owner gave false information on the pass, large sums of money were to be paid in fines. If a ship sailed without a sea pass, fines were given, and if a ship was captured without a sea pass, the skipper was – if he came back – punished with prison for one month. The fines were shared between the informer and the ransom for captured Swedish subjects in Turkey or Barbary. Fines were also given to any shipper who sailed in the Mediterranean without the Algerian Sea Pass, because this threatened the safety of the crew.⁴⁶ This clearly shows the importance that was placed on the safety of the seamen. The importance of the correct use of the Algerian Sea Passes was also discussed among state officials. For example, in a document about the security of the Swedish shipping with respect to Algerian cruisers, the importance of following the rules given by passes was discussed: “when an Algerian galley closes in it should be met with friendship and according to the directives”.⁴⁷ This was a reminder of the directives given in the peace treaty, but also a wish to avoid misunderstandings when Swedish ships were inspected.

The strict standards of human security given by the directions of the Algerian Sea Passes were not only meant to protect the seamen from Muslims corsairs but also from “doubtful” merchants engaged in long-distance shipping. This new attitude might also explain the diplomatic conflict between Sweden

⁴⁶ Sandklef 1952, 88-89.

⁴⁷ Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, ang. säkerhet för svenska sjöfarande mot algeriska kryssare 1743 6.9. Composite officers vol. 15.

and Hamburg. This conflict began in 1731 with a request from the Swedish resident at Hamburg, Carl Christoph Strahlenheim, to responsible authorities in Hamburg. Strahlenheim was instructed to act for the ransoming of 10-12 enslaved Swedes, left in Algiers, who had been caught while serving on Hamburg bottoms.⁴⁸ This type of request was unusual, maybe unique, between European states at this stage, but the request might be explained by the cultural similarities and the long tradition of economic alliances and friendship between Sweden and Hamburg.⁴⁹ The debate, in which the Swedes pushed hard for the security of their subjects, can be followed in a numbers of documents in the archives to the end of 1746.⁵⁰ As an aftermath to this diplomatic controversy, the King and the Board of Trade officially proclaimed in 1748 that Swedish subjects sailing under a foreign flag must ensure their security through the responsible shipping company to avoid the risk of becoming enslaved by any of the African states.⁵¹ This was both a warning and a recommendation from the state. Swedish state officials put forward a ransoming request when Swedes were captured on Danish ships, which was implemented, and in turn also helped Danes in captivity in Morocco.⁵² In these cases we can see that cultural resemblances and contacts had a positive effect on human security. It is therefore important to keep in mind that cultural values and contact between states also gave form and substance to the political process of human security.

Conclusion

Today, *human security* is described as an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities. Its proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. It is well known that policies for state security do not necessarily include policies for human security. States are in many cases providers of human insecurity outside as well as inside their own borders. There-

⁴⁸ Hamburger Staatsarchiv 111-1 Senat C1. VII Lit. Ca. Nr. 2, vol. 3, Fasc. 5a, Document 1.

⁴⁹ Kellenbenz 1958; Hildebrand 1884.

⁵⁰ Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, Medelhavet ang. tryggandet av sjöfarten i Medelhavet samt ang. den s.k. slavkassen i Hamburg m.m. Chancellery office to His Royal Majesty 1735 30.1 vol. 23. ang. svenska slavers utlösande i A. Composite offices to His Royal Majesty 1738 12.4 vol. 13. ang. den i algeriska slaveriet varande fältskiären Hiedenreichs 1740 5.2 Composite offices vol. 14. ang. säkerhet för svenska sjöfarande mot algeriska kryssare 1743 6.9. Composite offices vol. 15. ang. några svenska slavers i A. utlösande genom kollekt 1746 6.12. Chancellery office vol. 37.

⁵¹ Publication, angående the swenske siömän utlösen, som under främmande flagg blifwa fängne, 20 June 1748.

⁵² Landsarkivet Sjælland – EA-001 Sjællands Stift Bispeembde - 1715-1758 Kopibog for udgaaede breve vedr. slavekassen - Bind 1734-1745. fol. 235-239. Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index. Danmark ang. ur marockansk fångenskap utlösta danska undersåtar. Composite offices to His Royal Majesty 1766 1.7, vol. 19a.

fore situations where state security and human security are combined are highly interesting to study. This article has used the relationship between Sweden and the North African states as an example of this.

This analysis has shown the complex process of human security from 1660-1760: how human insecurity was identified, how solutions were implemented, the realization of human security, and what political and cultural factors affected this process. It is clear that the Swedish security policy was not only orientated towards state concerns but definitely also humanitarian and responded to ordinary people's needs when dealing with sources of threats. An interesting shift in the relationship between Sweden and the North African states began around 1720. With the establishment of the Swedish Convoy Office, the policies of national security and human security started to mutually reinforce each other. This was believed to be the most effective tool for the Swedish state to accomplish further economic development in the Mediterranean world. The professionalization and institutionalization of the human security policy (consulates, consuls, Sea Passes etc.) also made it easier for individuals such as George Logie to act more freely as agents of human security, compared to their predecessors. The difficult practice of human security during the Early Modern epoch was partly a function of the state's limited resources, but different historical, political and cultural variables also played an important role. The complex working of these factors has been highlighted. The Protestant Reformation, Lutheranism, the outcome of the disastrous Great Northern war, and the alliance with the Sublime Porte, were all factors that gave form and substance to the praxis of Swedish human security. In summary, this article has shown that cultural, political and historical factors played an important role for how human security could be carried out in different parts of Early Modern Europe.

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